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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Sean Anthony Thomas appeals from the district court’s order denying his
I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence.
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The state charged Thomas with one count of lewd conduct for sexually
abusing his daughter, who was between the ages of seven and nine at the time
of the abuse. (R., pp.6-7, 20-21.) Thomas agreed to plead guilty as charged.
(See R., pp.23-26.) The state agreed to recommend that the district court retain
jurisdiction if the psychosexual evaluator concluded that Thomas was a moderate
(or less) risk to re-offend, and was amenable to community-based treatment.
(See id.)
At a June 2, 2014 sentencing hearing, the state gave a sentencing
recommendation consistent with the plea agreement. (R., p.41; 6/2/14 Tr., p.12,
L.11 – p.13, L.1.) The district court followed this recommendation and imposed a
unified 15-year sentence with five years fixed, but retained jurisdiction.
(R., pp.52-54; 6/2/14 Tr., p.18, L.14 – p.19, L.4.) The court then entered the
judgment of conviction on June 12, 2014. (R., pp.52-54.)
In the next year, the district court did not place Thomas on probation or
affirmatively relinquish jurisdiction. Instead, on June 18, 2015, the district court
entered an order acknowledging that the period of retained jurisdiction had
automatically expired because more than 365 days had elapsed since it imposed
its sentence.

(R., pp.57-61.)

The court stated that earlier on that date, it
1

received an APSI and recommendation from the Idaho Department of Correction
to place Thomas on probation, but that it no longer had jurisdiction to act upon
the recommendation. (R., pp.58-59.) On July 30, 2015, the district court granted
Thomas’ motion for appointment of counsel to represent him in pursuing relief
under I.C.R. 35. (R., pp.64-67.)
Several months later, on October 8, 2015, Thomas, through counsel, filed
an I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence.

(R., pp.70-73.)

Thomas

requested that, based upon Department of Correction’s recommendation and the
information contained within the APSI, the district court either place him on
probation or reduce the fixed term of his sentence to one year so that he would
be immediately eligible for parole. (Id.) Thomas argued that his I.C.R. 35(b)
motion was timely because it was filed within 120 days of the district court’s June
18, 2015 order acknowledging that jurisdiction had been automatically
relinquished. (R., p.71.)
After two hearings (11/16/15 Tr.; 12/21/15 Tr.), the district court denied the
I.C.R. 35(b) motion on the ground that it was untimely.

(R., pp.98-103.)

Specifically, the court concluded that its jurisdiction over Thomas was
automatically relinquished on June 2, 2015, one year after the sentencing
hearing, and not, as Thomas asserted, on June 18, 2015, when the court entered
its order which merely acknowledged this prior relinquishing of jurisdiction. (Id.)
Therefore, the court concluded, Thomas’ I.C.R. 35(b) motion was untimely
because it was filed more than 120 days after jurisdiction had been relinquished.

2

(Id.) Thomas filed a notice of appeal that was timely from the district court’s
denial of his I.C.R. 35(b) motion. (R., pp.92-95.)

3

ISSUE
Thomas states the issue on appeal as:
Did Mr. Thomas timely file his Rule 35 Motion because his
period of retained jurisdiction began to run when the district court
filed its order retaining jurisdiction?
(Appellant’s brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Thomas failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
concluding that his I.C.R. 35(b) motion was untimely?

.
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ARGUMENT
Thomas Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Concluding That His I.C.R. 35(b) Motion Was Untimely
A.

Introduction
Thomas contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying

his I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence and concluding that the motion
was untimely. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-9.) Specifically, Thomas contends that his
I.C.R. 35(b) motion was timely because: (1) the period of retained jurisdiction did
not automatically expire until June 12, 2015, one year after the district court
entered its judgment of conviction; and (2) his I.C.R. 35(b) motion was filed within
120 days of June 12, 2015, and was therefore timely pursuant to that rule. (Id.)
Thomas has failed to show that the district court erred. The plain meaning
of I.C.R. 35(b) and I.C. § 19-2601(4) provide that a period of retained jurisdiction
expires 365 days after the sentence is pronounced by the district court, not 365
days after a court’s subsequent filing of the judgment of conviction. Therefore, in
this case, the period of retained jurisdiction automatically expired on June 2,
2015, one year after the district court pronounced sentence. Thomas’ I.C.R.
35(b) motion, filed 128 days later on October 8, 2015, was thus untimely.
B.

Standard Of Review
If a sentence is within statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence

under I.C.R. 35(b) is a plea for leniency, and this Court reviews the denial of the
motion for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203,

159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).
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The interpretation of court rules and statutes presents a question of law
over which appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho
796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 734, 228
P.3d 998, 1001 (2010).
C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Thomas’ I.C.R. 35(b) Motion
Was Untimely
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative

intent. State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v.
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because the
best guide to legislative intent is the wording of the statute itself, the
interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words.

Verska v. Saint

Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011);
State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). The words of a
statute “‘must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute
must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does
not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.’” Verska, 151 Idaho at 893,
265 P.3d at 506 (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719,
721 (2003)). “[W]here statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and
other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the
clearly expressed intent of the legislature.” Id. (quoting City of Sun Valley v. Sun
Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)).
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) provides that motions to correct or modify
sentences under that rule “must be filed within 120 days of the entry of the
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judgment imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction.” The 120day filing limit of I.CR. 35(b) is a jurisdictional restraint on the power of the court
which deprives the court of the authority to entertain an untimely motion. State v.
Fox, 122 Idaho 550, 552, 835 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Ct. App. 1992). Within this
timeframe, a defendant may file such a motion and attempt to “show that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Huffman,
144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840.
Idaho Code § 19-2601(4) provides that a district court may choose to
retain jurisdiction over a defendant after it pronounces sentence. Specifically,
I.C. § 19-2601 provides, in relevant part:
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a
plea of guilty, in any district court of the state of Idaho, of or to any
crime against the laws of the state, except those of treason or
murder, the court in its discretion may:
…
(4) Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the
first three hundred sixty-five (365) days of a sentence to the
custody of the state board of correction. The court shall retain
jurisdiction over the prisoner for a period of up to the first three
hundred sixty-five (365) days. Except as provided for in section 192601A, Idaho Code, during the period of retained jurisdiction, the
state board of correction shall be responsible for determining the
placement of the prisoner and such education, programming and
treatment as it determines to be appropriate. The prisoner will
remain committed to the board of correction if not affirmatively
placed on probation by the court.
Thus, the relevant phrases to be interpreted in this case are “order
releasing retained jurisdiction” in I.C.R. 35(b) and “sentence” in I.C. § 19-2601(4).
These provisions are unambiguous. Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) required Thomas
7

to file his I.C.R. 35(b) motion within 120 days of the “order releasing retained
jurisdiction.” The retained jurisdiction in this case automatically expired at the
conclusion of the first 365 days of Thomas’ sentence. State v. Taylor, 142 Idaho
30, 31, 121 P.3d 961, 962 (2005).

Thus, Thomas had 120 days from this

releasing of retained jurisdiction to file his I.C.R. 35(b) motion.1
The “plain, usual, and ordinary meaning” of the term “sentence” in
I.C. § 19-2601(4) refers to the district court’s pronouncement of sentence at a
sentencing hearing.

This is the event that identifies, and commences, a

defendant’s sentence. “[T]he only legally cognizable sentence in a criminal case
is the actual oral pronouncement in the presence of the defendant.” State v.
Wallace, 116 Idaho 930, 932, 782 P.2d 53, 55 (Ct. App. 1989)) (internal
quotation omitted); see also Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th ed. 2014 (defining
“sentence” as “[t]he judgment that a court formally pronounces after finding a
criminal defendant guilty; the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer”). In
this

case,

Thomas’

“sentence”

took

effect

upon

the

district

court’s

pronouncement of the sentence at the June 2, 2014 sentencing hearing. At that
time, and for the next 365 days, the district court and the Idaho Department of
Correction exercised concurrent jurisdiction over Thomas. (See 6/2/14 Tr., p.18,

1

In the alternative, this Court could conclude that the plain language of I.C.R.
35(b) permits a defendant to file an I.C.R. 35(b) motion for the reduction of
sentence only within 120 days of either “the judgment imposing sentence,” or an
actual “order releasing retaining jurisdiction.” Under such an interpretation, a
defendant would not be permitted to file, and a district court would have no
jurisdiction to consider, an I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence after a
period of retained jurisdiction is relinquished automatically due to the expiration
of the 365-day period, as opposed to via affirmative court order relinquishing
jurisdiction.
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L.25 – p.19, L.2 (the district court expressly stating, at the sentencing hearing,
that it, “retains jurisdiction of this matter for a period of up to 365 days and
place[s] [Thomas] in the custody of the Board of Corrections on a retained
jurisdiction….”).
State v. Peterson, 149 Idaho 808, 241 P.3d 981 (Ct. App. 2010) is
instructive. Peterson argued that the period of retained jurisdiction in his case
did not commence until Peterson was physically placed in the custody of the
State Board of Correction. Id. at 813, 241 P.3d at 986. The Idaho Court of
Appeals rejected this argument, concluding:
We agree with the state’s contention that I.C. § 19–2601(4)
allows a court to retain jurisdiction for the first 180 days2 of the
defendant’s sentence, not for the first 180 days after the defendant
is physically placed into the Board’s custody. A defendant’s
sentence begins when it is imposed by the court. I.C. § 20–209A.
As such, the plain language of I.C. § 19–2601(4)3 contemplates
that the time for the 180–day period of retained jurisdiction begins
to run once the sentence is pronounced, regardless of whether the
defendant is transported to the Board immediately or there is some
delay.
Id. (footnotes and emphasis added).
Likewise, in this case, the first 365 days of Thomas’ “sentence,” which
constituted the period of retained jurisdiction, commenced when the district court
pronounced sentence and retained jurisdiction on June 2, 2014, and not, as
Thomas contends, when the court later entered its judgment of conviction. The
2

At the time the district court sentenced Peterson, I.C. § 19–2601(4) provided
that a district court could retain jurisdiction over a defendant for the first 180 days
of a sentence. I.C. § 19–2601(4) (2008).
3

I.C. § 20-209A provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen a person is sentenced to
the custody of the board of correction, his term of confinement begins from the
day of his sentence.”
9

period of retained jurisdiction expired one year later, on June 2, 2015. Thomas’
I.C.R. 35(b) motion, filed 128 days after that, on October 8, 2015, was untimely
pursuant to that rule. Thomas has therefore failed to demonstrate that the district
court erred by denying his I.C.R. 35(b) motion on the ground that it was untimely.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
order denying Thomas’ I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence.
DATED this 13th day of October, 2016.
_/s/ Mark W. Olson______
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of October, 2016, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
MAYA P. WALDRON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

MWO/dd

_/s/ Mark W. Olson_____
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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